The Wall Street Journal has revealed that Sudan submitted an offer to Moscow last October allowing Russia to establish a naval base on the Red Sea overlooking one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors, a move that, if implemented, could redraw the map of military influence in the region.
According to the report, the offer grants the Kremlin a broad package of concessions in Sudan’s mining sector, alongside supplying Khartoum with advanced air defense systems, as part of a quid pro quo that reflects the Sudanese military government’s bid to deepen its strategic partnership with Russia. This comes at a time of intensifying international competition to control the gateway for trade between Europe and Asia via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, amid domestic and external concerns that such a pivot could push Khartoum’s relations with Washington and European capitals into deeper tension.
The Sudanese government has refused to officially comment on the accuracy of this information, while observers see the move as an attempt by Khartoum to balance Western pressure against its growing ties with Moscow. The available details on the Sudanese proposal to establish a Russian naval base on the Red Sea point to a shift that goes beyond a bilateral arrangement between Khartoum and Moscow, signaling instead a strategic repositioning at the heart of an international race over sea lanes and spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. In this context, war‑torn Sudan appears to be trying to leverage its geostrategic location and natural resources as a major bargaining chip with global powers, amid U.S.–Russian rivalry interwoven with Chinese and European calculations over control of the corridor linking the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal.
Content and scope of the offer
Reports indicate that the proposal submitted to Moscow in October would run for 25 years and give Russia the right to deploy up to 300 personnel and dock four warships, including nuclear‑powered vessels, in Port Sudan or another unspecified facility on the Red Sea. In return, the Kremlin would receive preferential access to Sudanese mining contracts, particularly in gold, while also supplying the Sudanese army with advanced air defense systems and weapons at favorable prices. This configuration turns the base into more than a simple military foothold, tying Russia’s naval presence to an economic power structure in a strategic sector that has become one of the main financial pillars of the wartime government in Khartoum.
Geopolitical dimensions in the Red Sea
The Red Sea has become one of the most crowded arenas for competing military and commercial projects, from China’s base in Djibouti to U.S. facilities in the Horn of Africa, as well as Moscow’s long‑running efforts to secure a permanent foothold in Port Sudan. Controlling a base along this stretch of coastline would give Russia greater capacity to monitor traffic to and from the Suez Canal, which handles about 12% of global trade, and would provide a long‑sought “warm‑water” port for resupplying and servicing its fleet. By contrast, the United States and its allies view any permanent Russian military presence in Sudan or Libya as a step that would allow Moscow to expand operations and “act with impunity,” in the words of Western officials and experts.
Power calculations in Khartoum
From within Sudan, the offer reflects the military government’s attempt to play the “Russia card” to offset its growing isolation from the West and secure new sources of weaponry in a war that is draining the army’s capabilities against the Rapid Support Forces. Yet this bet carries a potentially high diplomatic cost, as Sudanese officials have warned that such a deal could open a new front of tension with the United States and the European Union and further cement Khartoum’s image as aligned with a camp opposed to the West at a time of acute global polarization. The idea of effectively mortgaging a critical maritime facility and long‑term mining concessions to a foreign power also raises internal questions about the price of economic and political sovereignty in a country already fragmented by competing centers of power and spheres of influence.
Possible implications for regional balances
If the deal goes ahead, its impact would extend beyond Sudan’s borders to the wider region. A permanent Russian base on the Red Sea would add another major military player to an already crowded environment of foreign installations, from American to Chinese and others, entrenching a trajectory of “militarizing sea lanes” in the region. It could also prompt regional and international powers to recalibrate their roles and partnerships—and possibly to bolster their own military presence in response—turning the Red Sea into a space of sustained competition rather than merely a vital commercial route. In this complex landscape, Khartoum’s move looks like a high‑stakes gamble: it may provide a security and arms umbrella that strengthens the position of the ruling authorities, or it may become a strategic burden that deepens Sudan’s isolation and drags the country further into great‑power confrontations it cannot shape or control.
