Istanbul — In a carefully timed move, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pledged on Thursday to “enhance” cooperation with Sudan after meeting Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Ankara. The encounter came as Sudan’s brutal civil war, now well into its third year, drags on with no sign of a negotiated settlement.
In a statement, Turkey’s presidency said Ankara aims to expand collaboration with Khartoum across “numerous fields from trade and agriculture to defense industries and mining.” While details were scarce, the optics of Erdoğan welcoming al-Burhan at the presidential palace spoke volumes: Ankara is signaling its willingness to stand by Sudan’s embattled military leader at a moment of strategic fragility.
The Turkish president, who has extended both economic and military assistance to the Sudanese Armed Forces, condemned what he described as “one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises,” warning of “acts amounting to crimes against humanity, especially in El-Fasher.” Erdoğan added that Turkey remains committed to “peace, stability, and the territorial integrity of Sudan,” and will continue to deliver humanitarian aid. According to the official statement, the ultimate objective is “a permanent ceasefire and enduring peace for the Sudanese people.”
Sudan has been devastated since the conflict between al-Burhan’s army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted in April 2023. Tens of thousands have been killed, millions displaced, and entire cities reduced to rubble. As hunger and atrocities spread, external actors have taken sides Turkey aligning with the army, while the RSF is widely reported to receive backing from the United Arab Emirates, despite Emirati denials.
Geopolitics and Strategic Reach Behind the Meeting
Al-Burhan’s visit to Ankara coincides with rising pressure from the so‑called “Quad”—the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE to push for a holiday truce and enable humanitarian access. Progress, however, remains scant. With RSF forces making field gains, al-Burhan is increasingly in need of external leverage—the kind of diplomatic and military ballast that can strengthen his bargaining power in any future negotiations.
The Turkish meeting thus serves multiple purposes. Domestically, it reinforces al-Burhan’s narrative that the army is far from isolated; geopolitically, it allows Erdoğan to insert Turkey squarely into the Horn of Africa’s evolving balance of power.
Erdoğan mentioned “defense industries” as a pillar of cooperation an unmistakable sign that drone warfare will intensify. Reports already link al‑Burhan’s modest battlefield advances to Turkish‑supplied Bayraktar drones, which have altered conflicts from Libya to Ukraine. Critics warn that the proliferation of such technology risks escalating civilian casualties and entrenching the stalemate.
For Ankara, this is not an isolated case. It reflects a broader foreign‑policy template: exporting arms and training to build influence, then converting these relationships into enduring partnerships in maintenance, logistics, and munitions. Turkey has deployed the same playbook in Libya, Syria, and across the Sahel, securing both geopolitical footholds and lucrative defense contracts.
Mining, the Red Sea,
The inclusion of “mining” in the Turkish communiqué hints at economic ambitions behind the rhetoric of partnership. Sudan’s untapped mineral wealth and its access to Red Sea trade routes make it a valuable piece of Ankara’s wider Africa strategy a blend of opportunistic investment and strategic positioning.
This is hardly new. Ankara had once negotiated access to Suakin Island on Sudan’s Red Sea coast under Omar al‑Bashir, a deal later shelved amid Sudan’s political upheaval. The current conflict revives interest in such assets, as global and regional powers vie for influence along one of the busiest maritime corridors in the world.
A Parallel Track to the “Quartet”
While Turkey formally backs peace efforts, its actual posture diverges from that of the international Quartet. Washington and its partners focus on humanitarian ceasefires as precursors to political dialogue, whereas Ankara appears intent on shaping realities on the ground through military aid.
Turkey’s calculus partly overlaps with that of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both wary of Sudan’s state collapse. Yet its quiet rivalry with the UAE over influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea injects a deeper layer of strategic competition into the conflict. Caught between these agendas, the United States finds its leverage waning its sanctions blunted, and its calls for de‑escalation largely ignored by both warring sides.
In this crowded diplomatic field, Erdoğan’s overture to al‑Burhan looks less like crisis mediation and more like strategic positioning. For Turkey, Sudan’s war is not only a humanitarian tragedy it is also a geopolitical opportunity.
